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Abstract
Background: The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV)
after interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission, but many questions remain related to long-term poliovirus
risk management policies.
Methods: We used an integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to simulate possible
futures and estimate the health and economic outcomes of maintaining the 2013 status quo of continued OPV use
in most developing countries compared with OPV cessation policies with various assumptions about global
inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) adoption.
Results: Continued OPV use after global WPV eradication leads to continued high costs and/or high cases. Global
OPV cessation comes with a high probability of at least one outbreak, which aggressive outbreak response can
successfully control in most instances. A low but non-zero probability exists of uncontrolled outbreaks following a
poliovirus reintroduction long after OPV cessation in a population in which IPV-alone cannot prevent poliovirus
transmission. We estimate global incremental net benefits during 2013–2052 of approximately $16 billion (US$2013)
for OPV cessation with at least one IPV routine immunization dose in all countries until 2024 compared to
continued OPV use, although significant uncertainty remains associated with the frequency of exportations
between populations and the implementation of long term risk management policies.
Conclusions: Global OPV cessation offers the possibility of large future health and economic benefits compared to
continued OPV use. Long-term poliovirus risk management interventions matter (e.g., IPV use duration, outbreak
response, containment, continued surveillance, stockpile size and contents, vaccine production site requirements,
potential antiviral drugs, and potential safer vaccines) and require careful consideration. Risk management activities
can help to ensure a low risk of uncontrolled outbreaks and preserve or further increase the positive net benefits of
OPV cessation. Important uncertainties will require more research, including characterizing immunodeficient long-
term poliovirus excretor risks, containment risks, and the kinetics of outbreaks and response in an unprecedented
world without widespread live poliovirus exposure.
Background
Since its launch in 1988, the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative (GPEI) spearheaded interruption of indigenous
wild poliovirus transmission (WPV) of all 3 serotypes in
all but 3 countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria) by
2013 [1]. Since 2013, only serotype 1 WPV (WPV1)
transmission has led to any laboratory-confirmed para-
lytic cases, with no detected indigenous serotype 2 WPV
(WPV2) cases since 1999 [2] and no detected serotype 3
WPV (WPV3) cases since 2012 [3]. However, as long as
any WPVs circulate anywhere, they can cause outbreaks
in previously polio-free areas that do not maintain high
population immunity through intense vaccination [4–6].
This provides further imperative to interrupt global WPV
transmission as soon as possible. The live, attenuated oral
poliovirus vaccine (OPV) remains the polio vaccine of
choice in most countries because of its low costs, ease of
administration, and proven ability to interrupt transmis-
sion in poor-hygiene settings by inducing good intestinal
immunity and secondarily immunizing close contacts of
OPV recipients [7]. However, OPV causes very rare
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vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) in recip-
ients and close contacts [7, 8]. Thus, ending all paralytic
poliomyelitis disease (i.e., polio) requires global interrup-
tion of all WPV transmission and subsequent global cessa-
tion of OPV use [9]. In addition to relatively predictable
VAPP cases that will stop as soon as OPV use stops, in
populations with low immunity to poliovirus transmission,
OPV-related viruses can continue to circulate and evolve
to eventually acquire similar properties as WPVs, establish
widespread transmission, and cause outbreaks of circulat-
ing vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) [8, 10–14]. The
potential for cVDPVs motivates the requirement that
countries globally coordinate OPV cessation and neces-
sitates efforts to prepare for cVDPV outbreaks immedi-
ately after OPV cessation through intense surveillance,
development of an outbreak response strategy, and cre-
ation of a global OPV stockpile for outbreak response
[9, 15]. Moreover, long-term risks of vaccine-derived
poliovirus (VDPV) reintroductions from rare chronic
excretors with B-cell-related primary immunodeficien-
cies (i.e., iVDPVs) or intentional or unintentional re-
lease of any live poliovirus (LPV, i.e., WPV, VDPV,
OPV, or OPV-related poliovirus) imply the need for
continued management to ensure containment even
after successfully-coordinated OPV cessation [8].
Most high-income countries use the injectable, inacti-
vated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) exclusively for routine
immunization (RI), and middle-income countries con-
tinue to adopt IPV for RI using a sequential schedule of
IPV followed by OPV (IPV/OPV) or using an IPV dose
co-administered with the third non-birth OPV dose [16,
17]. IPV remains much more expensive than OPV, but
does not come with VAPP or cVDPV risks because it
does not contain a LPV [18]. In anticipation of OPV ces-
sation, the GPEI recommends and supports the addition
of one IPV dose co-administered with the third OPV RI
dose, which will provide some immunity for recipients
to the serotypes stopped [19]. IPV generally provides
better seroconversion (i.e., “take”) per dose for all three
serotypes than OPV and it protects vaccinated individ-
uals from polio [4]. However, IPV does not protect as well
as OPV from infections or from participation in asymp-
tomatic fecal-oral poliovirus transmission, and IPV re-
mains untested in its ability to stop or prevent poliovirus
transmission in developing countries [18, 20, 21]. Consist-
ent with data from clinical trials showing limited intestinal
immunity provided by IPV [20], despite IPV-only RI
coverage over 90 %, Israel recently detected intense
asymptomatic WPV1 transmission for 12 months likely
due to relatively lower hygienic conditions in the Bedouin
populations in the South [22, 23]. In the context of OPV
cessation, we previously showed that adding IPV to RI
provides only a very limited (if any) reduction of
cVDPV risks after OPV cessation, because the
populations most likely to experience cVDPV outbreaks
are characterized by low RI coverage and intense,
mostly fecal-oral transmission [24]. However, IPV may
offer a relatively greater reduction in long-term global
risks associated with iVDPV introductions or other re-
leases and may help prevent sustained transmission of
OPV-related viruses and thus cVDPV emergence in set-
tings with higher RI coverage and less fecal-oral trans-
mission [25]. As we move into the OPV cessation
transition period, uncertainty remains and discussions
will continue about the role of IPV.
A 2008 integrated economic analysis of global poliovirus
risk management policies after the certification of global
WPV eradication began with an assumption of cessation
of all OPV use in 2010 to explore post-eradication
immunization options [26, 27]. The analysis assumed that
any outbreaks occurring after OPV cessation would
remain contained within their populations of origin, which
varied randomly in size between 500,000 and 100 million
people [26, 27]. The analysis noted the need for further
work to better characterize the spread between popula-
tions of both the outbreak virus and any OPV-related
viruses used to respond to the outbreak [26, 27]. At the
time of that analysis, we anticipated that low- and middle-
income countries would continue to use trivalent OPV
(tOPV) until coordinated tOPV cessation following the as-
surance of global interruption of all WPVs. The poliovirus
transmission model used for the analysis [28] assumed
continued intense tOPV use to maintain relatively high
population immunity against all serotypes at the time of
tOPV cessation, which supported a focus on the “average”
serotype rather than each serotype. However, the GPEI
subsequently shifted its focus to first interrupting WPV1
transmission using serotype 1 monovalent OPV (mOPV1)
[29]. This led to gaps in population immunity to serotype
3 (and serotype 2), with ongoing WPV3 circulation neces-
sitating the use of serotype 3 monovalent OPV (mOPV3)
to respond to a resurgence of WPV3 cases. The licensure
of bivalent serotype 1 and 3 OPV (bOPV) in 2010 allowed
the use of bOPV to cover both circulating WPV serotypes.
However, the decreased use of serotype 2-containing OPV
(currently only available in tOPV) reduced population im-
munity to serotype 2 transmission and led to numerous
serotype 2 cVDPV (cVDPV2) emergences, including sev-
eral large and prolonged outbreaks [10, 13]. In part due
to these outbreaks, the GPEI Strategic Plan 2013–2018
proposed phased globally-coordinated withdrawal of
the OPV serotypes, starting with globally-coordinated
cessation of serotype 2-containing OPV (i.e., OPV2 ces-
sation, planned for April 2016) [30], regardless of the
interruption of WPV1 and WPV3 [19]. The plan in-
cludes the introduction of at least one IPV dose into the
RI schedules in OPV-using countries prior to OPV2 cessa-
tion [19]. While the plan anticipates simultaneous
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globally-coordinated cessation of serotype 1-containing
OPV (OPV1) and serotype 3-containing OPV (OPV3)
after 2018 (OPV13 cessation), the possibility of certifica-
tion of global WPV3 interruption in 2016, while WPV1
may continue to circulate, raises the potential for phased
withdrawal of OPV3 and then OPV1 [31]. Potential delays
associated with stopping cVDPV2 circulation early enough
to meet the April 2016 OPV2 cessation timing may also
necessitate delay in OPV2 cessation, which could then
motivate discussions about simultaneous withdrawal of
OPV2 and OPV3 [32].
The use of serotype-specific OPV and increased
adoption of IPV significantly changed both the space of
endgame policy options [31] and the global starting condi-
tions. Moreover, intense research and development efforts
may change IPV costs, and recent evidence provides new
data to inform cVDPV and iVDPV risks and to better
characterize immunity to poliovirus transmission using
models. Motivated by the evolving evidence, policy land-
scape, and population immunity levels across the world,
this study presents an expanded integrated global model
to assess the economics of polio endgame policies starting
from 2013. No prior analysis considers global policies to
achieve global WPV interruption and manage the end-
game starting with the current GPEI strategic plan [19].
Methods
Analytical framework
We develop a model to characterize prospectively the
economic outcomes associated with long-term poliovirus
risk management policy options. The 40-year analytical
time horizon runs from the beginning of 2013 (T0)
through the end of 2052 (Tend). The model considers 200
countries included in both the United Nations World
Population Prospects (2012 revision) [33] and the World
Bank list of economies (as of 2013) [34]. We categorize
countries as low-income (LOW), lower middle-income
(LMI), upper middle-income (UMI), and high-income
(HIGH) according to the 2013 World Bank levels [34] to
approximate the variability in conditions throughout the
world. The analysis takes a global, societal perspective and
thus includes all costs and benefits regardless of who pays
or receives them. We use a 3 % discount rate [35, 36] for
future costs and polio cases to report 2013 net present
values and we use the United States Consumer Price
Index [37] to convert all financial estimates to 2013
United States dollars ($), unless indicated otherwise.
Table 1 lists the policy options we consider, including
two reference cases (RCs) that continue the status quo
indefinitely with or without continued supplemental
immunization activities (SIAs) (i.e., RC with SIAs, RC
without SIAs). In all of our analyses, we assume that
countries using an IPV-only or IPV/OPV sequential RI
schedule at T0 will continue to use IPV for the entire
analytical time horizon. However, for countries that use
OPV at T0 we consider the current strategic plan
through 2018 [19] followed by global minimum policies
of IPV use for 5 or 10 years following OPV13 cessation
(i.e., IPV5, IPV10), and IPV use through the end of the
analytical time horizon (IPV through Tend). We also con-
sider a policy that follows the current plan for OPV2
cessation in 2016 and OPV13 cessation in 2019 except
that countries using OPV-only at T0 do not introduce
IPV (i.e., No IPV). We assume that these global IPV op-
tions reflect minimum requirements, with the expect-
ation that countries can always opt to do more than the
minimum recommended policy [31]. The model as-
sumes that LOW and LMI countries that currently use
OPV-only would opt for the minimum policies, but
UMI countries that use OPV-only or IPV/OPV at T0 will
use IPV through Tend regardless of the global minimum
policies (Table 1).
We compute the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio
(ICER) and incremental net benefits (INB) of each
alternative option compared to each RC, which con-
tinues the status quo indefinitely and encompasses the
spectrum of SIA frequencies that might occur with
continued OPV use. We express the ICER in $ per pre-
vented (paralytic) polio case and $ per disability-
adjusted life-year (DALY) [38] averted and the INB in $
(see equations in Additional file 1). Negative values for
ICERs distort the interpretation of these ratios [27, 39].
For example, an intervention with $100 in incremental
costs but one more case compared to the status quo
represents an undesirable option but receives the same
ICER of −100 $/case as a desirable intervention that
saves $100 and prevents one case. Therefore, we refer
to ICERs with negative incremental costs and negative
prevented cases as cost-saving but life-costing (CSLC),
those with negative incremental costs but positive pre-
vented cases as cost- and life-saving (CLS), and those
with positive incremental costs but negative prevented
cases as dominated [26]. Given complications associ-
ated with aggregating ICERs across different income
levels, we report the ICER separately for each income
level, while we report the INB both by income level and
as a global aggregate [26, 40].
We implemented the model in JAVATM using Eclip-
seTM and perform model runs on the Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud. We perform 100 stochastic iterations
of the model for all considered policy options, and we
use the results to characterize the economic metrics
based on the average annual costs and cases by income
level. For the RCs, one iteration suffices, because they
do not include the stochastic poliovirus reintroduction
events after OPV cessation, and we confirmed limited
impact of random poliovirus exportations in the context
of continued OPV use.
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Economic inputs
Table 2 shows the economic model inputs. The GPEI Fi-
nancial Resource Requirements (FRRs) [41] of the
current six-year plan for 2013–2018 [19] include a total
of $4.1 billion in resources budgeted to individual coun-
tries, and another $1.4 billion of global programmatic
costs for technical assistance, surveillance and the Glo-
bal Polio Laboratory Network, and other global-level
and regional-level costs not budgeted to any individual
countries. We assume that all policy options would incur
approximately the same global programmatic costs, and
therefore we do not include these in the incremental re-
sults. We calculate immunization costs associated with
delivering vaccine doses based on unit cost estimates
from prior work [18, 40, 42]. We attribute any difference
between our estimates of aggregate costs based on this
approach and those budgeted in the FRRs to costs not
covered by GPEI resources, such as national resources
for RI (including in-kind contributions), volunteer time
[43], and any bilateral funds not included in the FRRs.
We base our SIA cost estimates directly on the unit
cost inputs in Table 2 and the targeted numbers of chil-
dren vaccinated during SIAs estimated by the model and
adjusted for wastage [44]. Table 2 assumes that the
administration costs per OPV dose during outbreak re-
sponse SIAs (oSIAs) equal 1.5 times those during
regular, planned preventive SIAs (pSIAs) [42]. In
addition to treatment costs, the INB accounts for the so-
cietal costs associated with lost wages and suffering due
to polio. In the absence of any direct estimates, we ap-
proximate these by equating each DALY associated with
polio with the appropriate average annual per capita
gross national income [26, 27, 36, 40, 45, 46].
Global poliovirus transmission model
We expanded and revised the poliovirus transmission
model [28] used in the 2008 economic analysis [26, 27],
to address the more complex policy space [47]. Specific-
ally, the differential equation-based expanded poliovirus
transmission and OPV evolution model (i.e., the DEB
model): (1) characterizes each serotype separately (to
analyze serotype-specific vaccination policies and risks),
(2) considers explicitly both fecal-oral and oropharyngeal
transmission (to account for the differential impact of
IPV on fecal and oropharyngeal excretion), (3) uses 8 re-
cent immunity states to reflect immunity derived from
maternal antibodies, only IPV vaccination, only LPV in-
fection, or both IPV vaccination and LPV infection (to
more realistically capture the differences in immunity
derived from IPV and LPV), (4) includes multi-stage
waning and infection processes (for more realistic
characterization of these processes), (5) characterizes
Table 1 Main minimum global policy options considered for the economic analysis. We assume that countries using IPV-only at T0
will continue to do so indefinitely regardless of the policy choice.
Policy
abbreviation
Description Characterization in countries using OPV-
only at T0 (LOW, LMI, or UMI)
Characterization in countries using IPV/OPV at
T0 (UMI or HIGH)
RC with
SIAs
Continued status quo Continue tOPV-only indefinitely for RI
supplemented with bOPV and tOPV SIAs
Continue IPV/OPV indefinitely supplemented
with bOPV and tOPV SIAs
RC no SIAs Continued status quo, but with no SIAs
from 1/1/2019
Continue tOPV-only indefinitely for RI
supplemented with bOPV and tOPV SIAs
until 1/1/2019
Continue IPV/OPV indefinitely supplemented
with bOPV and tOPV SIAs until 1/1/2019
IPV5 Current plan [19] with IPV everywhere for
5 years after all-OPV cessation
• Add IPV doses to RI schedule on 1/1/
2015a
• Replace all tOPV with bOPV on 4/1/2016
• Replace all tOPV with bOPV on 4/1/2016 • OPV13 cessation on 4/1/2019, switch RI to
IPV-only indefinitely
• OPV13 cessation on 4/1/2019b
• IPV cessation on 4/1/2024 in LOW and
LMI countries
IPV10 Current plan [19] with IPV everywhere for
10 years after all-OPV cessation
• Same as above but with IPV cessation of
4/1/2029 in LOW and LMI countries
• Same as above
IPV through
Tend
Current plan [19] with IPV everywhere
until at least Tend
• Same as above but without IPV
cessation anywhere
• Same as above
No IPV Current plan [19] but without global IPV
use after OPV cessation of any type
• Replace all tOPV with bOPV on 4/1/2016 • Replace all tOPV with bOPV on 4/1/2016
• OPV13 cessation on 4/1/2019 • OPV13 cessation on 4/1/2019, switch RI to
IPV-only indefinitely
Abbreviations: bOPV, bivalent OPV (serotypes 1 and 3); HIGH, high-income; IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine; LMI, lower middle-income; LOW, low-income; OPV, oral
poliovirus vaccine; OPV13 cessation, globally-coordinated cessation of OPV containing serotypes 1 and 3; RC, reference case; RI, routine immunization; SIA, supplemental
immunization activity; T0, beginning of analytical time horizon (i.e., January 1, 2013); Tend, end of analytical time horizon (i.e., December 31, 2052); tOPV, trivalent OPV;
UMI, upper middle-income
a Assumes a single IPV dose administered synchronously with OPV to any child that receives at least one non-birth OPV RI dose in LOW and LMI countries, but a
sequential IPV/IPV/OPV/OPV schedule in UMI countries
b Assumes LOW and LMI countries continue with a single-dose IPV schedule while UMI countries switch to a 3-dose IPV-only RI schedule indefinitely
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OPV evolution as a 20-stage process from OPV as ad-
ministered to fully-reverted polioviruses with assumed
identical properties to typical homotypic WPVs (to allow
cVDPV emergence to occur within the model), and (6)
accounts for heterogeneous preferential mixing between
mixing age groups and subpopulations [47] (Additional
file 1).
For this analysis, we adopt all generic model inputs from
the DEB model [47, 48]. We further scale the model up to
a global level by characterizing global variability and mix-
ing between populations. In the context of limited infor-
mation to characterize all countries and heterogeneity
within them and finite computing resources, we developed
a simplified global model that does not explicitly identify
individual countries or populations. Instead, it stratifies
the world into 71 epidemiological blocks that each consist
of 10 subpopulations with approximately 10 million
people at T0 (i.e., a global population of 7.1 billion people).
A subpopulation corresponds to a population with
spatially homogeneous but age-heterogeneous mixing
such as a country, state, or large city within a large coun-
try, or a group of well-connected smaller countries of the
same income level. A block corresponds to a larger epi-
demiological area such as parts of very large countries
(e.g., Western Uttar Pradesh in India, the northern states
of Nigeria), large countries (e.g., Egypt, Ethiopia,
Philippines), or groups of connected countries (e.g., Cen-
tral Africa, West Africa minus Nigeria). Table 3 provides a
breakdown of the global population as of 2013 [33] by
World Bank income level [34] and polio vaccine use as of
October 2012 [16] for all 200 countries with available data.
Table 3 also allocates the 71 blocks to the different combi-
nations of income level and polio vaccine use at T0. For
this allocation, in some cases we assigned countries
smaller than a block to a block with a higher or lower in-
come level because of geographic proximity to countries
Table 2 Economic model inputs by World Bank income level [34] for vaccine, treatment, and societal costs in 2013 United States
dollars ($), with earlier estimates converted using the United States Consumer Price Index. [37]









Vaccine price per dose [18,73]
- OPV (any formulation) $ 0.12 $ 0.12 $ 0.13 $ 0.16
- IPV (10-dose vial) $ 1.30 $ 2.30 $ 3.20 $ 13.00
Effective vaccine wastage [18,42,44]
- OPV in RI 50 % 50 % 30 % 10 %
- OPV or IPV in SIAs 44 % 44 % 44 % 44 %
- IPV (10-dose vial) 40%a 40%a 30 % or 25%a 10 % or 5%a
Administration costs per dose [18,42]
- OPV in RI $ 0.86 $ 0.86 $ 2.29 $ 2.90
- OPV co-administered in RIb $ 0.30 $ 0.30 N/A N/A
- OPV in pSIAs $ 0.60 $ 0.60 $ 3.30 $ 4.20
- OPV in oSIAsc $ 0.90 $ 0.90 $ 4.95 $ 6.30
- IPV single antigen in RI $ 1.08 $ 1.08 $ 2.86 $ 10.36
- IPV combo in RI N/A N/A $ 0.72 $ 2.59
Treatment costs per paralytic polio case $ 650 $ 6,500 $ 65,000 $ 650,000 [26,40]
Disability-adjusted life-years per paralytic
polio case
13 14 14 14 [26,40]
Societal economic costs per paralytic polio
cased
$ 7,800 $ 27,000 $ 96,000 $ 550,000 [40,46]
Abbreviations: IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine; N/A, not applicable; OPV, oral poliovirus vaccine; oSIA, outbreak response SIA; pSIA, planned, preventive SIA; RI,
routine immunization; SIA, supplemental immunization activity
a Based on estimates for single IPV-dose in low and lower middle-income countries, and 2 (sequential) or 3 or more IPV doses (IPV-only) in the RI schedule,
respectively, with lower values than prior estimates [18] to reflect the subsequently modified WHO open vial policy [74]
b Incremental cost of for OPV co-administered with an IPV dose; estimate based on judgment
c oSIA administration costs assume 1.5 times the costs for pSIAs [42]
d Based on DALY estimate, multiplied by the average annual per-capita gross national income of $597 for 33 low-income countries, $1,898 for 45 lower middle-
income countries, $6,885 for 45 upper middle-income countries, and $39,091 for 49 high-income countries [46]. No estimates were available for 3 low-income
countries (i.e., Democratic Republic of Korea, Myanmar, and Somalia), 3 lower middle-income countries (i.e., Djibouti, West Bank and Gaza, Syrian Arab Republic), 5
upper middle-income countries (i.e., Argentina, Belize, Cuba, Iran, Libya), and 17 mostly small high-income countries (i.e., Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Israel, Kuwait,
New Zealand, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and small island nations or extra-territorial states with autonomous status) otherwise included in the analysis.
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that used the same polio vaccine in 2013 that probably in-
curred similar vaccine expenditures and transmission
conditions.
We characterize random periodic infective interactions
with people from other subpopulations and blocks. Spe-
cifically, we track the cumulative number of effective in-
fections (CEI, defined as the cumulative prevalence of
infectiousness-weighted infectious people) in each sub-
population, by virus reversion stage. Whenever the CEI
of a reversion stage reaches a certain exportation thresh-
old (E*) we trigger a potentially effective introduction of
virus from the same reversion stage into another sub-
population and reset the CEI to zero. The exportation of
poliovirus may or may not lead to an effective introduc-
tion that establishes transmission depending on micro-
level dynamics not explicitly captured in the DEB model,
and chance (e.g., the precise location of the virus intro-
duction that impacts whether the infection spreads be-
yond the first household(s)) [49]. Therefore, we randomly
determine if the exportation leads to an effective introduc-
tion, defined as an introduction that establishes
subpopulation-wide transmission (i.e., transmission be-
yond the individual(s) importing the virus and its immedi-
ate surrounding household or community), using a
function for the probability of an effective introduction
(PEF), which logically depends on the immunity level of
the receiving subpopulation. We model the PEF as a func-
tion of the mixing-adjusted net reproduction number
(Rn), which represents the average number of secondary
infections generated by a single infection accounting for
population immunity calculated as the basic reproduction
number (R0) multiplied by the effective susceptible pro-
portion [50]. Rn in a subpopulation depends on the base-
line R0 of the subpopulation and the virus strain (i.e.,
different R0 values for different serotypes and reversion
stages) [47, 48] and changes with time depending on vac-
cination policies, any immunity derived from LPV expos-
ure, and seasonality. Thus, PEF depends on all of these
factors through Rn (Additional file 1).
Effective virus introductions may or may not lead to
an outbreak (i.e., at least one polio case) depending on
the population immunity level in the receiving subpopu-
lation and the kinetics of the initial infections relative to
the seasonally changing R0. However, if they do, an out-
break can unfold very quickly in the model due to the
assumption of homogeneous mixing within relatively
large subpopulations of approximately 10 million people.
The homogenous mixing assumption implies faster
propagation of the virus than would occur if in reality
the subpopulation remains more heterogeneous [47, 51].
Given the inability to observe ineffective introductions
that die out locally due to chance or locally effective in-
troductions that do not continue to circulate due to high
surrounding population immunity, and the reality of
spatial heterogeneity in mixing within subpopulations,
estimating the exportation threshold E* from data on
long-range exportations remains challenging.
Based on the relatively localized transmission of
cVDPVs to date despite presumably large numbers of in-
fections (e.g., Nigeria) [13], we determine E* such that a
cVDPV2 outbreak in a subpopulation within a year fol-
lowing OPV2 cessation yields approximately one ex-
pected effective exportation to another subpopulation,
assuming an aggressive and effective response in the
subpopulation of the initial outbreak. This criterion leads
to an estimate of E* of 200,000 CEIs and remains con-
sistent with our current experience associated with
cVDPV and WPV importation outbreaks in the context
of populations with recent widespread LPV exposure.
We remain uncertain about the kinetics of poliovirus
transmission between populations in the unprecedented
context of no recent global LPV exposure as the time
since OPV cessation increases, but our model assumes
that the inherent frequency of potentially effective ex-
portations per CEI (i.e., E*) does not change over time.
However, the probability that an exportation becomes
effective in the receiving subpopulation increases in the
absence of recent LPV exposure through the depend-
ence of PEF on Rn, which increases rapidly after OPV
cessation in high-R0 populations, regardless of IPV use
[24, 52]. Similarly, the outbreak kinetics following an ef-
fective introduction speed up as the time since OPV ces-
sation increases.
Assuming preferential mixing between the subpopu-
lations in an epidemiological block, we assume that 24
out of 25 (96 %) exportations go to random subpopula-
tions within the same block, while the remaining 1 out
of 25 (4 %) go to random subpopulations of other
blocks (i.e., inter-block exportations). Thus, inter-block
Table 3 Distribution of the global population as of 2013 [33] in
hundreds of millions by World Bank income level [34] and polio
vaccine use as of October 2012 [16] covering 200 countries with
available data (i.e., 99.7 % of the global population) with
numbers in parentheses indicating the number of
corresponding epidemiological blocks in the global model
Income
level
Polio vaccine use at T0 Total
blocksUnknown OPV-only IPV/OPV IPV-only
Unknown 0.233 (0) 0 (0) 0 0 0
LOW 0 (0) 8.46 (8) 0 0 9
LMI 0 (0) 24.2 (25) 0.67 (0) 0 25
UMI 0 (0) 18.7 (19) 5.31 (7) 0.39 (0) 25
HIGH 0 (0) 0.28 (0) 2.32 (2) 10.21 (10) 12
Total blocks 0 52 9 10 71
Abbreviations: HIGH, high-income; IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine; LMI,
lower middle-income; LOW, low-income; OPV, oral poliovirus vaccine; T0, be-
ginning of analytical time horizon (i.e., January 1, 2013); UMI,
upper middle-income
Duintjer Tebbens et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:389 Page 6 of 21
exportations occur once every 5 million CEIs on aver-
age (i.e., 1/200,000 × 1/25). To determine the importing
block for an inter-block exportation, we group all 71
blocks into 9 regions with variable number of blocks,
corresponding to large geographical regions (i.e., Africa,
Australasia, China and neighbors, East and Central
Asia, Europe, India, Latin America and the Caribbean,
North America, and South Asia) (Additional file 1). We
assume that 3.5 % of all exportations (i.e., 87.5 % of all
inter-block exportations) go to a random block in the
same region and that the remaining 0.5 % (i.e., 12.5 %
of all inter-block exportations) go to a random block in
a different region. To characterize the global variability
in conditions relevant to poliovirus transmission, we
vary a number of model inputs by subpopulation re-
lated to viral transmission (i.e., R0 and its seasonal fluc-
tuations, the relative importance of oropharyngeal and
fecal-oral poliovirus transmission) and immunization
program performance (i.e., OPV take rates, RI and SIA
intensity, and surveillance quality)(Additional file 1).
To approximate the WPV prevalence and global im-
munity levels at T0 we run the model for a “burn in”
period to begin the policy comparisons starting with
initial conditions that approximate actual demographic
profiles and exposure histories [47] (Additional file 1).
Simulation of post-OPV cessation risks
We assume tOPV intensification leading up to OPV2
cessation maximizes population immunity at OPV2 ces-
sation and avoids cVDPV2 emergences after OPV2 ces-
sation [24, 52] and sufficient bOPV use before OPV13
cessation to avoid subsequent cVDPVs. Thus, we focus
on other risks, including the small, but non-zero prob-
abilities of unintentional or intentional release of LPV
and introduction of iVDPVs from prolonged or chronic
excretors [8, 53, 54]. Table 4 provides estimates for the
non-cVDPV risks based on the currently available evi-
dence [54] and updated from prior work [8].
For the iVDPV risks, we constructed a discrete-event
simulation (DES) model of long-term iVDPV excretor
prevalence to estimate iVDPV prevalence until and after
OPV cessation of each serotype [54]. For each stochastic
iteration of the global model, we use one stochastic
realization of the DES model to generate random intro-
ductions of iVDPV into the general population after
OPV cessation. We randomly generate contacts with the
general population for each individual with active long-
term iVDPV excretion after OPV cessation. To estimate
the rate of general population contacts, we assume that
R0 provides a measure of the average number of contacts
per approximately 30 days for immunocompetent indi-
viduals, assuming approximately 30 days of excretion for
fully susceptible individuals [47]. While we model R0 as
ranging from 4–13 globally [47], we assume that any
primary immunodeficiency disease (PID) patients sur-
viving long enough to become long-term excretors in
any setting mix much less intensely with others than
immunocompetent individuals in the general popula-
tion (i.e., their continued survival depends on relatively
good hygiene and limited mixing), with their R0 values
effectively ranging from 1–4. We further assume that
the majority of contacts (i.e., 95 %) involve close con-
tacts (e.g., in the same household) with individuals who
possess sufficient immunity to prevent further spread
due to their ongoing exposure to the long-term excre-
tor. This leaves between 0.05 and 0.2 contacts (i.e., R0
of 1–4 times 5 % of contacts that are not close) per
30 days with the general population for a long-term
excretor, or an average time of approximately 150–600
days between potential contacts that may lead to an
iVDPV infection in the general population (Table 4).
We draw a random contact rate for each individual
long-term excretor from this range with a uniform dis-
tribution. Based on the contact rate for the individual
long-term excretor, we randomly determine the time
between general population contacts and include as po-
tentially effective iVDPV introductions all contacts
until (1) the excretor dies, (2) the excretor recovers and
stops excreting, or (3) the time of the next contact ex-
ceeds the analytical time horizon (i.e., it would occur
after 2052). In addition to using the DES model [54] to
track the prevalence of and generate potentially effect-
ive introductions from long-term excretors infected
prior to OPV cessation, we also use it to account for
the possibility of creating new iVDPV excretors ex-
posed to any mOPV used to respond to outbreaks after
OPV cessation (Additional file 1). As with LPV impor-
tations, iVDPV excretor contacts with the general
population or other releases of poliovirus may or may
not lead to effective introductions depending on micro-
level dynamics and chance, and therefore we apply the
PEF to determine whether the introduction establishes
transmission.
For IPV production sites releases, we assume that
ongoing production of IPV from WPV seed strains will
continue indefinitely in 5 fixed different subpopulations in
HIGH blocks, which may generate potential WPV intro-
ductions at any time. We assume that a further 7 (for
IPV5 or IPV10) or 10 (for IPV through Tend) facilities in
non-HIGH subpopulations from a selected list of blocks
that use OPV-only at T0 will produce IPV from Sabin seed
strains (Additional file 1). These sites may generate poten-
tial OPV introductions as long as IPV remains in use in
the corresponding block, which depends on the policy
option. The literature documents 4 reported containment
failures during the past 25 years of IPV production [8, 55,
56], and one additional breach of containment from an
OPV production site [8]. While improved containment
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Table 4 Global model inputs that do not vary between blocks, characterization of oSIAs, and characterization of non-cVDPV risks and
potential polio antiviral drug use
Model input Value
Age groups 0-2, 3–11 months; 1–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15-39a; ≥
40 yearsa
Number of equally-sized subpopulations per block 10
Proportion of children receiving fewer than 3 non-birth RI doses who receive 1 non-birth dose 0.2
Proportion of children receiving fewer than 3 non-birth RI doses who receive 2 non-birth doses 0.2
Relative coverage with birth dose compared to non-birth RI coverage with 3 doses
- LOW, LMI blocks that use OPV-only at T0 0.5
- All other blocks 0
Average per-dose take rate for IPV
- LOW, LMI 0.63
- UMI 0.70
- HIGH 0.75
Duration of each SIA (days) 5
Number of oSIA rounds
- Before homotypic OPV cessation 3
- After homotypic OPV cessation, R0 < 12 4
- After homotypic OPV cessation, R0≥ 12 6
Geographical scope of oSIAs
- Before homotypic OPV cessation Subpopulation
- After homotypic OPV cessation, R0 < 10 Subpopulation
- After homotypic OPV cessation, R0≥ 10 Block
Target age groups Cohorts born since OPV cessation, rounded
to next multiple of 5
oSIA impact
- True coverage 0.8
- Repeated missed probability 0.7
Time from outbreak detection until the first oSIA (days)b
- No ongoing outbreak response in block 45
- Outbreak response already ongoing in block 30
Interval between oSIA rounds (days) 30
Number of years when mOPV allowed for oSIAs after OPV cessation of each type (years) 5
Exportation threshold (E*, i.e., cumulative effective infections needed to trigger a potential exportation
from a subpopulation)
200,000
Proportion of virus exportations
- within the same block 0.960
- in another block within the same region 0.035
- outside of the region 0.005
Characterization of post-OPV cessation risks (non-cVDPV)
Average time between contacts of long-term iVDPV excretors with the general population (days) 150-600
Global Poisson ratec for release of unreturned OPV (only during first year after OPV cessation of
each type and in blocks that use OPV at T0) (1/year)
0.1
Global Poisson ratec for release from IPV production site (1/year) 0.2
Global Poisson ratec for other unintentional or intentional release (1/year) 0.025
Probability that other unintentional or intentional release is unintentional 0.5
Distribution of unintentional releases by income level
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guidelines may reduce this risk, some releases may have
gone unnoticed due to currently very high population im-
munity to transmission, and global IPV production will in-
crease. Therefore, we assume a continued rate of IPV
production site releases of 1 per 5 years, independent of
the number and locations of IPV production sites. Upon
triggering a vaccine production site release, the model
randomly selects one of the assumed production sites.
The location determines the type of virus released (i.e.,
WPV from a current production site in a HIGH block or
OPV from a non-HIGH Sabin-IPV production site), while
the model randomly selects the serotype (each with equal
probability). The selection of the virus determines its
transmission properties, and we randomly determine the
probability that the release comprises an effective intro-
duction based the Rn-dependent PEF, as for other releases
or virus importations. Although potential future research
may develop non-replicating IPV seed strains, we do not
consider that possibility in this analysis.
We assume much lower rates for other releases, trans-
lating into an approximately 10 % chance of a release of
unreturned OPV during the first year after OPV cessation,
and 10 % chance of any other intentional or unintentional
release at any point during the analytical time horizon
(Table 4). If any of these releases occurs, we randomly
select the OPV (i.e., in the event of an unreturned OPV
release) or WPV serotype released with equal probability,
and the receiving subpopulation according to the assumed
distribution of the risk by income level in Table 4. To en-
sure comparability across policies, we use the same list of
potential post-OPV-cessation introduction events for all
policy options, and in some cases the policy choice affects
whether the potential introduction takes place.
Characterization of outbreak response after OPV
cessation
Table 4 includes model inputs related to oSIAs. Once a
block eliminates WPV, but before OPV cessation, we start
accumulating the incidence of polio cases in each subpop-
ulation resulting from effective importations or indigenous
cVDPV emergences. If the cumulative incidence of WPV
or fully-reverted VDPV cases per 10 million people
reaches more than the subpopulation-specific detection
threshold (i.e., 1, 2, or 3 polio cases), then this triggers
Table 4 Global model inputs that do not vary between blocks, characterization of oSIAs, and characterization of non-cVDPV risks and





Distribution of intentional releases by income level
- LOW, LMI, UMI 0.5
- HIGH 0.5
Characterization of impacts of PAVDs
Proportion of long-term iVDPV excretors who had VAPP that receive PAVDs
- No PAVDs (base case) 0
- PAVD40% 0.5
- PAVD90% 0.9
Proportion of asymptomatic long-term iVDPV excretors that receive PAVDs
- No PAVDs (base case) 0
- PAVD40% 0
- PAVD90% 0.9
Proportion of long-term iVDPV excretors receiving PAVDs who recover
- PAVD40% 0.4
- PAVD90% 0.9
Abbreviations: cVDPV, circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; HIGH, high-income; IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine; iVDPV, immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-
derived poliovirus; LMI, lower middle-income; LOW, low-income country; OPV, oral poliovirus vaccine; oSIA, outbreak response SIA; PAVD(40 %, 90 %), polio anti-
viral drug (passive or active use policy, respectively); R0, basic reproduction number for serotype 1 wild poliovirus; RI, routine immunization; T0, beginning of ana-
lytical time horizon (i.e., January 1, 2013); SIA, supplemental immunization activity; UMI, upper middle-income
a Age groups impacting the fraction of newborns born as maternally immune children [47,52]
b Detection of paralytic cases assumes a time of 10 days between onset of infection and paralysis to reflect the average incubation period [47]
c Global Poisson rates indicate the baseline annual rate at which potential introduction events occur anywhere in the world, with the distribution by income level
indicated separately or as indicated in the text for IPV production site releases
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outbreak response SIAs (oSIAs) in the subpopulation
that override any scheduled pSIAs and that start
at 45 days after detection. After the oSIAs, the subpopu-
lation returns to its post-WPV-elimination schedule
(Additional file 1) and again begins accumulating polio
cases from WPV or fully-reverted VDPV until any new
detection occurs. After global OPV cessation of a sero-
type, the nature of outbreak response changes. We accu-
mulate polio cases from any LPV (i.e., all OPV-related
viruses) to trigger oSIAs and we modify the response
strategy to reflect sufficiently aggressive response to
minimize the chances of failing to fully control outbreaks
after OPV cessation, as shown in Table 4. In the event of
a subpopulation-specific response after OPV cessation,
we assume that all other subpopulations in the same
block remain on “high alert” between detection and the
completion of the last oSIA in the outbreak subpopula-
tion, characterized as high acute flaccid paralysis (AFP)
surveillance quality (i.e., detection after occurrence of 1
cumulative paralytic case per 10 million people) and a
short response delay (i.e., 30 days between detection and
the first oSIA).
We assume that subpopulations that use IPV-only at
T0 would use only IPV for oSIAs any time after they
switch to IPV-only and particularly after global OPV
cessation, based on the unavailability of OPV for out-
break response in the United States (i.e., the largest IPV-
only country to date) [57, 58], although some IPV-only
countries responded to outbreaks with both IPV and
OPV [22, 59]. For all other subpopulations, the vaccine
choice depends on time and the detected serotype. Spe-
cifically, before OPV cessation of any serotype oSIAs use
tOPV (if serotype 2 poliovirus detected) or bOPV (if no
serotype 2 poliovirus detected), during the first 5 years
after OPV cessation of any serotype they use mOPV of
the detected serotype, and any time after that they use
IPV, because we assume that the risk related to reintro-
ducing large amounts of LPV becomes too large to use
OPV that long after OPV cessation. The optimal dur-
ation of mOPV use for oSIAs after OPV cessation re-
mains uncertain, but 5 years resulted in a very low
probability (i.e., <1 %) of exported OPV-related viruses
establishing transmission in other subpopulations or
blocks, given all other model assumptions. We do not
constrain the amount of mOPV and IPV available for
oSIAs after OPV cessation, which allows us to estimate
potential vaccine needs from the stockpile, based on
the total targeted population in all oSIAs after OPV
cessation, adjusted for the estimated wastage rates dur-
ing SIAs (Table 2). We report the fraction of stochastic
iterations in which for at least one serotype the num-
ber of mOPV doses needed for oSIAs exceeds the 500
million total and 100 million filled mOPV doses of
each serotype currently planned for the stockpile.
Variations of the IPV5 policy
In the context of the IPV5 policy, we consider the po-
tential impact of the adoption of polio antiviral drugs
(PAVDs) to treat iVDPV excretors from 2017 forward,
which would potentially clear their infections [54]. We
consider IPV5 with PAVD passive use as one option,
which assumes 40 % effectiveness in clearing the infec-
tion with treatment of 50 % of excretors with paralysis
on January 1, 2017 and of those who subsequently de-
velop paralysis (i.e., IPV5, PAVD40%). We also consider
IPV5 with PAVD active use, which assumes 90 % effect-
iveness in clearing the infection and treatment of 90 %
of all excretors with an ongoing infection after January
1, 2017 (i.e., IPV5, PAVD90%). We randomly pre-
determine which excretors would recover from their
iVDPV infections as a result of PAVD treatment based
on the probabilities for the two scenarios, which provide
some bounds on the combined effectiveness of the
PAVD compound(s) and the degree of passivity of efforts
to identify and treat iVDPV excretors. We also consider
the impact of a failure to intensify tOPV use leading up
to OPV2 cessation, which assumes continuation of the
SIA schedule from before the year 2015 up until the
time of OPV2 cessation (Additional file 1). Finally, we
consider the impact of a higher E* and lower cumulative
paralytic case thresholds used to trigger an OPV re-
start (compared to the base case threshold of 50,000 cu-
mulative polio cases after 2016 above which we assume
countries that used OPV as of 2013 would restart using
OPV).
Results
Expected future burden of polio cases
Table 5 reports the average total number of cases
(including VAPP) over the analytical time horizon,
broken down by iterations with or without OPV restart,
the number of iterations with uncontrolled outbreaks
leading to OPV restart in all countries that use OPV at
T0 (i.e., the number of runs reaching 50,000 cumulative
cases), and the number of iterations with any detected
outbreaks that trigger a response. For all policies involv-
ing OPV cessation, ≥96 % of iterations involve one or
more outbreaks after OPV cessation, which implies ex-
pected use of the vaccine stockpile and outbreak re-
sponse plans. The majority of the outbreaks trace back
to long-term iVDPV excretors, who can re-introduce po-
lioviruses years after OPV cessation when population
immunity to transmission becomes low enough to allow
these viruses to establish transmission and cause out-
breaks. However, the longest expected survival of iVDPV
excretors occurs in lower-R0 settings with less fecal-oral
transmission [54] in which IPV provides more impact
on poliovirus transmission. In higher-R0 settings we ex-
pect few long-term iVDPV excretors to survive beyond
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the 5-year window during which our model allows
mOPV use for oSIAs.
Aggressive outbreak response rapidly controls the ma-
jority of the expected outbreaks, avoiding exportations
to other subpopulations and blocks that would lead to a
high number of cases after OPV cessation and eventual
OPV restart. However, for IPV5 and IPV10, 2 of 100 it-
erations led to poliovirus reintroductions that occurred
at a time and place with very low IPV-only-induced
population immunity (i.e., due to a combination of high
enough R0 and contribution of fecal-oral transmission
and introduction long enough after OPV cessation) that
triggered an OPV restart. One of these traced back to an
iVDPV1 introduction in a very high-R0 block relatively
soon after OPV cessation, which triggered mOPV SIAs
that infected a PID patient who became a new long-term
excretor and reintroduced an iVDPV1 at a time when the
model no longer allows mOPV use for outbreak response.
The other traced back to an unintentional or intentional
“other” release (i.e., from an accidental breach in labora-
tory containment or a bioterrorism event) of WPV3 in a
LMI block with an R0 of 8 in the second half of the year
2049. As in most relatively higher R0 populations, we ob-
served for the first OPV restart iteration that even a very
large number of oSIAs with IPV with a block-wide geo-
graphical scope and increasingly wide target age range
could not control the outbreak. While the IPV oSIAs kept
the incidence relatively low and delayed spread to other
blocks for many years, eventually enough effective expor-
tations occurred to trigger new large outbreaks and accu-
mulate over 50,000 cases. These two iterations provide
two examples from a larger number of possible scenarios
that could potentially lead to an OPV restart and they
average between approximately 300,000-700,000 expected
polio cases, depending on whether the OPV restart in-
volves resumed SIAs. However, based on 100 stochastic it-
erations, any such scenario represents a relatively rare
event in the context of our assumed aggressive outbreak
response and frequency of spread between populations.
The 98 iterations that control all outbreaks with IPV5
average an expected 340 post-OPV-cessation polio cases.
The policy of IPV through Tend led to a total of 10
OPV restarts, including the 2 that occurred with IPV5
or IPV10 and 8 additional iterations associated with re-
lease of Sabin seeds strains from Sabin IPV (sIPV) pro-
duction sites after the year 2035 and located in blocks
with a R0 between 9 and 11. This led us to the general
observation that in some relatively high-R0 blocks (e.g.,
R0 ≥ 9), any releases of Sabin seed strains can eventually
establish uncontrollable transmission. Thus, based on
the historical rate of releases from poliovirus vaccine
production sites during the last 25 years, the use of any
LPV strains in high-R0 populations presents an import-
ant risk that requires management. Releases of WPV
and Sabin seed strains also occurred in lower-R0 blocks
in some iterations, but these either did not establish any
transmission (e.g., Sabin seed strain releases) or led only
to smaller, controlled outbreak in high-income blocks
(WPV seed strain releases).
The policy of No IPV use assumes that all blocks that
use OPV-only at T0 do not add IPV at any time before
or after OPV cessation. The absence of any IPV use in
these blocks allows population immunity to drop more
rapidly, particularly in medium-R0 populations (i.e., be-
tween 6–8) in which we expect better survival of long-
term iVDPV excretors. Consequently, for this policy
Table 5 Undiscounted, average total cases for the main minimum global policy options and number of iterations with OPV restart





IPV5 IPV10 IPV through
Tend
No IPV
Average number of cases after type-specific OPV cessation, 2013-2052a 6,800 1,600,000
- No OPV restartb 340 120 470 840
- OPV restart with SIAs 350,000 320,000 120,000 170,000
- OPV restart without SIAs 720,000 680,000 540,000 880,000
- All iterations, OPV restart with SIAs 7,300 6,400 12,000 11,000
- All iterations, OPV restart without SIAs 15,000 14,000 55,000 54,000
Number if iterations with OPV restart N/A N/A 2 2 10c 6
Number of iterations with one or more post-OPV cessation outbreak
response
N/A N/A 96 96 96 100
Abbreviations (see Table 1 for policy abbreviations): IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine; N/A, not applicable; OPV, oral poliovirus vaccine; SIA, supplemental
immunization activity; Tend, end of analytical time horizon (i.e., December 31, 2052)
a Does not include a total of approximately 1,150 cases (i.e., approximately 1,100 VAPP, 80 WPV1, and 3 cVDPV2 cases) before OPV cessation of each type for the
two reference cases or the No IPV options and approximately 1,000 cases (i.e., approximately 920 VAPP, 80 WPV1, and 3 cVDPV2 cases) before OPV cessation of
each type for the policies that involve IPV use everywhere
b OPV restart defined as the occurrence of at least 50,000 polio cases since 2016 and by 2051, leading to OPV restart at the beginning of 2052 or earlier
c In addition, in 4 other iterations, the model included ongoing transmission of live poliovirus at the end of the analytical time horizon, but the cumulative
number of cases did not hit the contingency of 50,000 yet
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option we observed 5 iterations in which iVDPV intro-
ductions triggered an eventual OPV restart (in addition to
one OPV restart associated with an “other” release that
caused an OPV restart for all policies), including one new
iVDPV excretor associated with mOPV use for outbreak
response after OPV cessation (Additional file 1).
For the global IPV policies (i.e., IPV5, IPV10, or IPV
through Tend), the estimated number of mOPV doses
needed from a stockpile for use in oSIAs after OPV ces-
sation exceeded the currently planned 100 million filled
mOPV doses for at least one serotype in 32 stochastic it-
erations (i.e., including 23 iterations for mOPV1, 12 for
mOPV2, 8 for mOPV3). Given that all mOPV use in the
model occurs within 5 years of OPV cessation of each
serotype, this suggests a high probability of needing to
fill some of the bulk mOPV stock soon after OPV cessa-
tion. In 2 stochastic iterations, the estimated number of
mOPV doses exceeded the currently planned total stock-
pile of 500 million mOPV doses for at least one serotype
(i.e., 1 for mOPV1 and 1 for mOPV3). One of those 2 it-
erations led to an OPV restart even in the event of an
unlimited stockpile. In the other iteration, exhaustion of
the entire mOPV stockpile would result in an eventual
OPV restart due to the lack of a viable alternative oSIA
vaccine to prevent ultimate exportations of the outbreak
virus to other populations with low immunity levels.
Thus, an insufficiently large stockpile carries some risk
of ultimately leading to OPV restart (i.e., an insufficient
stockpile may lead to much higher OPV demands asso-
ciated with OPV restart).
The average numbers of cases for each policy show a
clear dichotomy between iterations that typically control
outbreaks rapidly and iterations that led to OPV restart
(Table 5). Iterations with controllable outbreaks repre-
sent the most common outcome and yielded fewer than
1,000 expected cases on average between OPV cessation
of each type and the end of the analytical time horizon.
IPV10 instead of IPV5 reduced the expected average
number of post-OPV-cessation cases in those iterations
by more than half from 340 to 120, while No IPV more
than doubled the expected average number of cases to
840. IPV through Tend increased the expected average
number of cases with no OPV restart compared to IPV5
or IPV10, because in 4 iterations transmission resulting
from a late release from an sIPV site continued until
Tend (without resulting in an OPV restart), which drove
up the average. Iterations that restart OPV typically in-
volve one year with a very high burden of paralytic cases
followed by all remaining years with either high burden
(i.e., OPV restart without SIAs) or low burden (i.e., OPV
restart with SIAs). With both options, for runs with
OPV restart, the year prior to the OPV restart drives the
average number of cases to over 100,000 cases. Despite
the relative rarity of OPV restarts, they significantly
increase the expected average cases. Nevertheless, the
expected average cases for all OPV cessation policies re-
main far below the expected cases of RC no SIAs, which
results in an ongoing VAPP burden in all OPV-using
populations and re-established cVDPV transmission in
many of them.
Figure 1 shows the average annual incidence (i.e.,
undiscounted cases) for the full analytical time horizon
based on 100 stochastic iterations of the model for the
different policies. Clearly, RC no SIAs represents the
worst option in terms of annual cases (Fig. 1a and b).
On this scale, the burdens for RC with SIAs and all OPV
cessation options remain negligible until the time when
larger, uncontrolled outbreaks occur in a small number
of iterations, resulting in bumps in the average numbers
of cases. Subsequent years either exhibit noticeable aver-
age numbers of cases (i.e., Fig. 1a assuming OPV restart
without SIAs) or very small numbers of cases (i.e., Fig. 1b
assuming OPV restart with SIAs) compared to the refer-
ence case without SIAs. To better show the behavior for
typical runs that do not involve uncontrolled outbreaks,
Fig. 1c omits RC no SIAs and all iterations that lead to
an OPV restart. For IPV5, the dynamics in Fig. 1c reflect
the average incidence from relatively common but small
outbreaks between OPV2 cessation in 2016 and the end
of both IPV use for RI and mOPV use for oSIAs in
2024. The average numbers of cases in subsequent years
reflect lower probability events with higher conse-
quences due to iVDPV introductions in relatively
medium- or low-R0 populations that get controlled by
IPV oSIAs and/or local burn-through of susceptible in-
dividuals before the virus can spread more widely,
resulting in more peaky behavior associated with larger
outbreaks in a few stochastic iterations. IPV10 substan-
tially reduces the expected probability and consequences
of these events compared to IPV5. However, for IPV
through Tend, Fig. 1c shows the occurrence of some late
releases of Sabin seed strains from IPV production
sites, including 4 iterations in which LPV transmission
continued until Tend without triggering an OPV restart.
Despite the possibility of outbreaks after OPV cessation,
the expected number of annual cases for the subset of
typical runs that do not result in an OPV restart re-
mains below the expected annual number of VAPP
cases of RC with SIAs in each year, and very far below
the expected annual burden of RC without SIAs (off-
scale in Fig. 1c).
Expected future vaccination costs
Figure 2 shows the expected vaccinations costs over
time, which do not include the global programmatic
costs associated with preparing for OPV cessation or any
specific risk management activities after OPV cessation
other than RI and oSIAs. The panels break down the
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results by OPV restart outcome similar to the panels of
Fig. 1. The first years show a marked increase in vaccin-
ation costs associated with the introduction of IPV in RI.
For all OPV cessation options the costs drop dramatic-
ally after OPV13 cessation in 2019, which coincides with
the cessation of SIAs for RC without SIAs. A further
drop in costs occurs at the time of cessation of universal
IPV use (if applicable). Nevertheless, significant costs
continue to occur throughout the analytical time hori-
zon due to the assumed continued use of IPV in RI in
UMI and HIGH blocks that already use IPV at T0. For
IPV through Tend, the continued IPV use everywhere
combined with the need to respond to releases of Sabin
seed strains from sIPV production sites in some itera-
tions imply much higher costs than the other OPV ces-
sation policies and RC no SIAs, but these costs remain
below the expected costs of RC with SIAs. The average
costs of No IPV highlight the important costs associated
with oSIAs after OPV cessation, for which we assume
relatively higher costs than pSIAs, particularly for re-
peated and widespread but relatively ineffective IPV
oSIAs during years when we assume mOPV no longer
represents an option for oSIAs. Given that this occurs in
some iterations, the reactive behavior associated with No
IPV results in higher expected vaccination costs than
preventive investments in IPV RI with IPV5 or IPV10.
Notably, the No IPV option, thus, includes outbreak re-
sponse with IPV when it represents the only polio vac-
cine option, including use in countries that do not use
IPV in RI.
Economic analyses
Table 6 summarizes the results of the economic analysis
for IPV5 compared to the two RCs, broken down by in-
come level and aggregated over the 40-year time hori-
zon. In HIGH blocks, IPV5 implies a different path than
the RCs in only 2 out of 10 blocks, which would switch
to IPV-only after OPV13 cessation as opposed to con-
tinuing sequential IPV/OPV use in the RCs (Table 1).
This change results in a relatively small increase in costs,
but if divided by a very small number of VAPP cases pre-
vented yields very high ICER of approximately $3-5 mil-
lion per DALY averted, consistent with the known high
societal willingness-to-pay to prevent VAPP in developed
countries that already made the switch from OPV to
IPV [60]. In UMI blocks, the expected cases similarly re-
flect VAPP cases, which decrease with the move to an
eventual IPV-only schedule, but at a high incremental
cost of $12 billion (and thus high ICERs), particularly
compared to the costs of RC no SIAs. The impact of
switching to IPV in UMI and HIGH blocks appears
much less dramatic if expressed in terms of INBs, with
relatively small negative INBs, except for the comparison
of IPV5 to RC no SIAs in UMI blocks, which yields
Fig. 1 Expected, undiscounted burden of polio cases for the main
policy options based on 100 stochastic iterations of the global
poliovirus transmission model. (a) Assuming OPV restart without SIAs
if more than 50,000 cumulative cases occur after. (b) Assuming OPV
restart with SIAs if more than 50,000 cumulative cases occur after
2016. (c) Including only iterations without OPV restart (omitting
reference case without SIAs, which remains beyond the scale for this
panel). See Table 1 for policy abbreviations.
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INBs of $-3.5 billion and significantly decreases the posi-
tive global INBs. LOW and LMI countries appropriately
remain the focus of attention, because the impact of the
policy choices on costs and cases remains much more
significant.
Table 6 suggests that RC no SIAs results in many more
cases than expected with IPV5. Despite the inclusion of 1
IPV dose in RI during 2015–2024 with IPV5, RC no SIAs
remains more costly in LOW and LMI blocks. Conse-
quently, IPV5 represents a cost-and life-saving option
compared to RC no SIA, yielding almost $20 billion in
INBs in the combined LOW and LMI blocks. If instead
we compared IPV5 in LOW and LMI blocks with RC with
SIAs, then Table 6 suggests significant savings with a small
incremental number of expected cases (LOW blocks) or a
small number of expected prevented cases (LMI blocks,
not visible with the two significant digits shown in
Table 6). Consequently, we find that compared to RC with
SIAs, IPV5 represents a cost- and life-saving policy in
LOW blocks and a cost-saving but life-costing policy in
LMI blocks. Unlike the ICERs that change dramatically
with small denominators, the INBs remain more robust to
the choice of RC, with the difference in vaccination costs
for OPV with SIAs roughly equivalent to the societal costs
of paralytic polio cases associated with RC no SIAs. The
global INBs amounts to approximately $16 billion or $17
billion for comparison to RC no SIA or RC with SIAs, re-
spectively. The negative INBs in UMI and HIGH blocks
reduce the global INBs, which equal $18-20 billion if we
exclude the two highest income levels.
Table 7 shows the expected global costs, cases, and
INBs for the other main policy options and the modeled
IPV5 variations. IPV10 increases costs compared to
IPV5 while preventing a relatively small number of add-
itional cases, which decreases the global INBs by ap-
proximately $0.8 billion. As shown above, IPV through
Tend increases the expected number of cases while in-
creasing costs, leading to an overall reduction of the glo-
bal INBs of approximately $6 billion. No IPV does not
save costs due to relatively high numbers of oSIAs re-
quired, and it also yields more expected cases compared
to IPV5. Consequently, for No IPV the global INBs de-
crease by approximately $0.5 billion.
The IPV5, PAVD40% variation only prevented a small
number of outbreaks and did not notably affect the glo-
bal net benefits. In contrast, active PAVD use with IPV5,
PAVD90% prevented many iVDPV-associated outbreaks,
including one of the two events that triggered an even-
tual OPV restart with IPV5 (i.e., the OPV restart caused
by a long-term iVDPV excretor). Consequently, the ex-
pected number of cases for IPV5, PAVD90% decreased
by almost 4,000, resulting in an expected increase in the
global INBs of approximately $0.5 billion, which pro-
vides some economic justification for significant invest-
ment (e.g., $500 million) in the development of PAVDs
and strategies for actively identifying and managing
iVDPV excretors. The PAVD90% scenario also decreased
Fig. 2 Expected, undiscounted vaccination costs in 2013 United
States dollars ($) for the main policy options based on 100
stochastic iterations of the global poliovirus transmission model. (a)
Assuming OPV restart without SIAs if more than 50,000 cumulative
cases occur after 2016). (b) Assuming OPV restart with SIAs if more
than 50,000 cumulative cases occur after 2016. (c) Including only
iterations without OPV restart. See Table 1 for policy abbreviations.
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the number of stochastic iterations for which the esti-
mated number of mOPV oSIA doses required from the
stockpile exceeded 100 million for at least one serotype
from 32 to 6, and the number of stochastic iterations for
which the estimated number of mOPV oSIA doses
needed from the stockpile exceeded 500 million for at
least one serotype from 2 to 1.
No tOPV intensification prior to OPV2 cessation led
to a cVDPV2 outbreak in all 100 stochastic iterations as
a result of insufficient population immunity to serotype






























IPV5 vs. RC no SIAs and OPV restart without SIAs
LOW 2.9 3.9 2,700 420,00 −1.2 420,000 CLS CLS 4.7
LMI 6.1 7.4 3,700 350,00 −3.6 350,000 CLS CLS 15
UMI 12 8.1 150 1,200 3.7 1,000 3,600,000 250,000 −3.5
HIGH 16 15 3 8 0.4 5 80,000,000 5,600,000 −0.4
World 37 35 6,500 770,000 −0.6 770,000 N/A N/A 16
IPV5 vs. RC with SIAs and OPV restart with SIAs
LOW 2.9 8.9 1,400 1,500 −6.0 180 CLS CLS 6.0
LMI 6.1 18 2,400 2,400 −12 −48 CSLC CSLC 12
UMI 12 11 150 920 0.7 780 870,000 62,000 −0.5
HIGH 16 16 3 8 0.2 5 41,000,000 2,900,000 −0.2
World 37 53 3,900 4,800 −17 910 N/A N/A 17
Abbreviations (see Table 1 for policy abbreviations): CLS, cost- and life-saving; CSLC, cost-saving but life-costing; DALY, disability-adjusted life-year; HIGH, high-
income; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; INBs, incremental net benefits; LMI, lower middle-income; LOW, low-income; N/A, not applicable; OPV, oral polio-
virus vaccine; SIA, supplemental immunization activity; UMI, upper middle-income
Table 7 Expected global vaccination costs, paralytic cases, and incremental net benefits in 2013 United States dollars ($) for various
policy options and alternative assumptions, compared to the reference case without SIAs (i.e., policy RC no SIA)








IPV5 2 37 6,500 16
IPV10 2 38 6,200 15
IPV through Tend 10 42 21,000 10
No IPV 6 37 23,000 15
Variations on IPV5
IPV5, PAVD40% 2 37 6,500 16
IPV5, PAVD90% 1 36 2,300 16
No tOPV intensification prior to
OPV2 cessation
3 37 9,200 16
Doubled frequency of
exportations
5 38 29,000 14
Threshold for OPV restart
- 15,000 cumulative cases 2 37 6,500 16
- 10,000 cumulative cases 3 37 12,000 16
- 5,000 cumulative cases 4 37 16,000 16
- 1,000 cumulative cases 8 37 48,000 15
Abbreviations (see Table 1 for policy abbreviations): IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine; OPV, oral poliovirus vaccine; PAVD (40 %,90 %), polio antiviral drug (passive
or active use, respectively); RC, reference case; SIA, supplemental immunization activity; Tend, end of analytical time horizon (i.e., December 31, 2052); tOPV,
trivalent OPV
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2 poliovirus transmission in one subpopulation at the
time of OPV2 cessation. Aggressive outbreak response
with 4 block-wide oSIAs controlled the cVDPV2 out-
break in all 100 stochastic iterations, leading to a rela-
tively modest increase in average expected cases from
the cVDPV2 outbreak. However, No tOPV intensifica-
tion also affects population immunity to serotype 2
transmission in other subpopulations which would
otherwise intensify tOPV use. Consequently, in one of
the 100 stochastic iterations, we observed a different
realization of exportations related to an iVDPV2-
associated outbreak that ultimately led to an OPV re-
start. Thus, failure to intensify tOPV use prior to OPV2
cessation resulted in a notable increase in the average
expected number of cases by almost 3,000, and the need
for mOPV2 use to respond to the cVDPV2 outbreak
that increased the expected average costs by approxi-
mately $0.2 billion and decreased the global INBs by
$0.3 billion. Failure to intensify tOPV use prior to OPV2
cessation did not affect the number of stochastic itera-
tions for which the estimated number of mOPV oSIA
doses exceeded 500 million for at least one serotype.
However, the cVPDV2 outbreaks significantly increase
expected demand from the stockpile by almost 120 mil-
lion mOPV2 doses, which exceeds the size of the cur-
rently planned filled mOPV2 stockpile.
The assumed speed of viral spread between subpopu-
lations affects the ability of aggressive oSIAs to control
outbreaks after OPV cessation, prevent further spread,
and avoid eventual OPV restarts. For IPV5, we ex-
plored the impact of changing the exportation thresh-
old E* from 200,000 to 100,000 CEIs, which effectively
doubles the frequency of exportations. For IPV5, this
change resulted in 3 additional iterations with an even-
tual OPV restart and typically larger outbreaks in itera-
tions without an eventual OPV restart. As shown in
Table 7, the increased frequency of exportations leads
to higher expected costs, more expected cases, and a
decrease in the global INBs by approximately $1.2 bil-
lion compared to IPV5. This analysis demonstrates the
importance of the uncertainty associated with the po-
tential for international spread in an unprecedented
world with no recent LPV exposure. Table 7 further
shows the absence of any impact of varying the model
choice for the threshold for restarting OPV between
50,000 and 15,000 cumulative cases, with only a small
reduction in INBs for a reduction in the threshold to
as low as 1,000 cumulative cases. The effect remains
small because uncontrolled outbreaks typically include
many thousands of cases in the year before OPV re-
start, so that crossing the threshold typically occurs in
the same year regardless of the choice of threshold.
Thus, our economic results remain robust to realistic
choices for this threshold.
Discussion
The integrated, global dynamic poliovirus transmission
and stochastic risk model may help inform policy discus-
sions and choices, but the actual choices will depend on
many additional operational, political, epidemiological,
and financial considerations. We estimate expected INBs
of over $15 billion for a finite period of globally recom-
mended IPV use in all countries after global OPV cessa-
tion compared to continued OPV use. This result reflects
successful OPV cessation for nearly all of the model
iterations, assuming a well-managed, coordinated OPV
cessation process. In addition, it reflects the reality that
continued OPV use implies either very high costs forever
(i.e., for OPV with SIAs) or very high cases forever (i.e.,
for OPV without SIAs), or some outcome within this
spectrum that remains approximately equivalent in terms
of INB due to the high societal costs of paralytic poliomy-
elitis [61]. These INB results confirm the economic benefits
of global polio eradication and subsequent OPV cessation
reported by prior economic analyses [26, 40, 61–65]. The
quantitative results differ from prior analyses because
of differences in the framing of the analyses and evolv-
ing policies and assumptions. For example, our prior
analysis of post-eradication policies [26] considered a
20-year period after simultaneous cessation of all three
OPV serotypes instead of the 40-year time horizon
encompassing phased OPV cessation in this analysis.
The prior analysis [26] found negative INBs for indefin-
ite IPV use compared to OPV without SIAs and en-
couraged research to develop more affordable IPV,
which contributes to the positive INBs observed in this
analysis. Our prospective economic analysis finds simi-
lar positive INBs going forward compared to an analysis
[40] that found $13-23 billion (year 2010 United States
dollars) in INBs for 2013–2035 when comparing global
polio eradication in mostly low- and lower middle-
income countries with a counterfactual policy of relying
only on RI since 1988. The current model includes
much more complexity than any prior integrated eco-
nomic model, including transmission between popula-
tions, increased immunity states to characterize
population immunity and waning, OPV evolution to
simulate cVDPV emergence, serotype differences, and a
detailed model to estimate iVDPV prevalence after
OPV cessation [54].
Similar to prior analyses, characterizing incremental
cost-effectiveness at a global level remains challenging
because we cannot aggregate ICERs across income
levels due to different criteria as to what constitutes a
cost-effective intervention in different income levels
[26, 27, 39, 45] In this analysis, the ICERs across in-
come levels range from highly cost- and life-saving in
the lower income levels to relatively cost-ineffective
(i.e., compared to other public health interventions)
Duintjer Tebbens et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:389 Page 16 of 21
due to very small denominators in the higher income
levels that at this point only benefit from VAPP reduc-
tion. Cost-effectiveness analyses from specific high- and
upper middle-income countries similarly estimate high
costs per prevented polio case [60, 66–68], and the
reality that countries nevertheless chose IPV over OPV
suggest a high societal willingness-to-pay to prevent
VAPP cases.
In addition to providing some health economic justifi-
cation for IPV use during the endgame, the model pro-
vides several important insights related to its role. First,
the model confirms that IPV provides only a limited re-
duction in cVDPV risks after OPV cessation, because the
same conditions that favor cVDPV outbreaks after OPV
cessation also limit the impact of IPV RI on population
immunity to poliovirus transmission [24]. Second, des-
pite the limited impact of IPV on cVDPV risks, global
IPV use substantially reduces medium and long-term
risks. This occurs because we anticipate most of the
medium- and long-term poliovirus reintroduction risk
(i.e., from long-term iVDPV excretors and unintentional
or intentional releases from laboratory containment fail-
ure) to come from populations characterized by rela-
tively lower R0, lower contribution to transmission from
fecal-oral spread, and higher RI coverage. In these popu-
lations, IPV may prevent the initial transmissions that
lead an introduction to establish population-wide trans-
mission. Thus, although No IPV saves considerable costs
initially, our results suggests that it ultimately leads to
higher expected costs due to the need to respond to
more and larger outbreaks and the increased probability
of failing to control outbreaks. Third, continued IPV use
everywhere may present a different risk associated with
the possible production of IPV in high-R0 populations if
sIPV production occurs in these areas. The model sug-
gests that even Sabin IPV seed strains may establish
transmission if released in high-R0 populations. Fourth,
based on the current evidence [20–22, 24] our model
suggests that in high-R0 populations, even aggressive
outbreak response using IPV likely will not stop trans-
mission long after OPV cessation. Thus, no viable out-
break response strategy would exist to stop poliovirus
spread if it occurs more than approximately 5–10 years
after OPV cessation and in the absence of a large mOPV
stockpile in populations with conditions conducive to
fecal-oral poliovirus transmission. The use of mOPV for
oSIAs longer after OPV cessation, while able to effectively
control the outbreak, may spread to other populations
outside the response with low enough population immun-
ity to support transmission of OPV-related viruses and/or
may create new long-term iVDPV excretors.
As previously demonstrated [52], the prevention of
cVDPVs after OPV cessation requires intense SIAs with
homotypic OPV prior to OPV cessation. This analysis
suggests that prevention represents the best risk manage-
ment strategy. However, on the current path, the high
probability of at least one outbreak after OPV cessation
and the small but non-zero probability of uncontrolled
outbreaks underscore the importance of numerous risk
management efforts in addition to IPV use for successful
OPV cessation and beyond.
First, aggressive outbreak response plans should repre-
sent a prerequisite for OPV cessation, because they can
make the difference between experiencing only con-
trolled outbreaks and failing to control outbreaks leading
to OPV restart. Our model includes sufficiently aggres-
sive outbreak response to minimize the probability of
failing to control outbreaks, ranging from a minimum of
4 initial rounds in populations with approximately 10
million people to a maximum of 6 initial rounds in pop-
ulations with approximately 100 million people (Table 4),
in a few cases repeated multiple times to ultimately
interrupt transmission. Further research may determine
whether less aggressive outbreak response may suffice in
some populations. Development of a clear strategy to de-
termine the scope of outbreak response after OPV cessa-
tion remains a critical area of research, including the
choice of vaccine (IPV, mOPV, tOPV) and consideration
of the quality of rounds, response delays, geographical
scope, and interval between rounds.
Second, in view of the problems associated with cur-
rently available vaccines to respond to any outbreaks
long after OPV cessation, development of new poliovirus
vaccines with the ability of OPV to induce intestinal im-
munity but without its risks (e.g., OPV that does not re-
vert to VDPV or IPV that provides intestinal immunity,
all produced with non-replicating strains) could greatly
reduce the long-term risks. In the context of the possi-
bility of high-consequence events associated with release
of live poliovirus seed strains used for IPV production,
efforts to develop non-replicating IPV seed strains may
prove very valuable if countries or the world collectively
intend to continue using IPV for many years.
Third, high bio-containment levels of laboratories
and any IPV production sites that use any replicating
seed strains in medium- to high-R0 countries remain
important, regardless of the level of RI coverage with
IPV in the surrounding population given that fecal-oral
transmission can readily occur despite high IPV-only
coverage [22, 23]. Environmental surveillance in popula-
tions surrounding IPV production sites that use replicat-
ing seed strains may offer a complementary strategy to
help decrease the time until detection of any release
compared to AFP surveillance, which may improve the
chances of controlling the outbreak before extensive
spread, although doing so requires a viable long-term out-
break response strategy in addition to early detection. In
the absence of such as strategy and given that IPV
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production sites experienced multiple accidental LPV re-
leases in the past despite high bio-containment levels [55,
56], our model results suggest the need to discourage pro-
duction of IPV using any replicating seed strains beyond
the first few years after OPV cessation in medium- to
high-R0 settings.
Fourth, high-quality surveillance represents an essen-
tial ingredient for successful OPV cessation. This ana-
lysis assumed only case-based surveillance, but future
analyses may consider the benefits of different levels of
environmental surveillance (e.g., a global system focused
on high-risk areas) as well as the consequences of re-
duced AFP surveillance quality over time.
Fifth, our results demonstrate that world health leaders
should expect small outbreaks and the need to use some
vaccine from the stockpile aggressively to prevent subse-
quent wider spread, which demonstrates that creation of
the vaccine stockpile represents a prerequisite for OPV
cessation [15, 69]. Depending on the required scope of
outbreak response needed to contain the outbreak and the
time for filling from bulk, the stockpile may require more
filled mOPV doses than currently planned for one or
more serotypes, and planning for a global IPV stockpile
should start as soon as possible. Vaccine stockpile needs
require further analysis and consideration in the context
of outbreak response plans.
Finally, our model reveals potential value of PAVDs, as
long-term iVDPV excretors emerge as the principal
source of outbreaks after OPV cessation (i.e., assuming
no cVDPV outbreaks due to tOPV intensification prior
to OPV2 cessation and continued bOPV SIAs through
OPV13 cessation). For effective PAVD use, efforts to
identify, treat, and manage asymptomatic long-term
iVDPV excretors appear as important as efforts to de-
velop effective PAVDs.
As with any model, our analysis comes with some limi-
tations. Although the DEB model reflects extensive expert
reviews of the literature [10, 20, 21] and the model calibra-
tion process involved a wide range of situations [6, 23, 24,
47, 50, 70–72], the model limitations from prior analyses
[47] carry forward to the global model. The model as-
sumes spatially-homogeneous (age-heterogeneous) mixing
in subpopulations of approximately 10 million people,
which implies faster spread than more heterogeneous
mixing, which we attempted to counter-balance with what
might appear as a relatively low assumed rate of exporta-
tions between subpopulations. Other limitations carried
forward from the poliovirus transmission and OPV evolu-
tion model include uncertainty about the numerical im-
pact of IPV-only on poliovirus transmission in different
settings (which determines how fast population immunity
to transmission decreases after OPV cessation), the extent
with which waning of immunity affects transmission, the
relatively simple age-mixing structure, the uncertain speed
of OPV evolution within populations, and the construct
to capture die-out in the deterministic model [47]. Spe-
cific limitations of the integrated global model include
the characterization of the global variability and mixing
using a finite number of subpopulations (which only
approximates the true variability and global mixing pat-
terns), the conservative assumption that R0 values and
RI coverage levels will remain constant into the future,
the exclusion of global programmatic costs for both the
OPV cessation policies and continued OPV use (which
may partly cancel out in the incremental outcomes, but
imply underestimation of the non-incremental costs),
and the uncertainties discussed below. Moreover, while
our model captures the possibility of exportations of OPV
used during an outbreak response to other subpopula-
tions, it does not account for the potentially higher prob-
ability of exportation of OPV at the borders between the
targeted and non-targeted population that may mix more
intensely. We did not perform additional uncertainty or
sensitivity analyses because the computational costs of
doing so remain prohibitive and changing any of the as-
sumptions of the poliovirus transmission and OPV evolu-
tion model would reduce its consistency with observed
behavior in the modeled specific situations unless we re-
calibrate the entire model [47]. We also based our results
on only 100 model iterations, with further iterations ex-
pected to lead to the realization of some other sequences
of rare events that we did not yet observe in the model.
Finally, our estimates of future vaccine prices and wastage
remain uncertain and significantly impact the economic
results, which suggest the need for future evaluation of
these assumptions. Future studies should address uncer-
tainties as more evidence becomes available and areas
identified in this analysis as important for further work
(e.g., outbreak response strategies), and consider more
stochastic iterations as needed.
Despite the many complexities included in our global
model, many uncertainties and stochastic events limit
our ability to predict what will actually happen in an un-
precedented post-OPV era and which may lead to a wide
range of potential consequences. Probably the most im-
portant uncertainty relates to the speed of spread of po-
lioviruses between populations in the absence of any
recent prior LPV exposure. We explored this uncertainty
by varying the threshold (i.e., E*) to trigger potentially
effective exportations, which demonstrated a substantial
impact on the ability to control outbreaks after OPV ces-
sation. Measurement or other direct estimation of this
model input remains impossible, and therefore we can-
not know with high confidence whether the true value
lies below, inside, or above the range we explored. How-
ever, comparison of the modeled behavior of cVDPV
outbreaks within a year after OPV cessation with the ex-
perience from historical cVDPV outbreaks provides
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some indication that the range we considered probably
adequately captures the kinetics and appropriately cor-
rects for the simplification inherent in the assumption of
spatially-homogeneous mixing within subpopulations in
the model. In addition, exportations represent stochastic
events, with chance determining the actual path. The
value of E* interacts directly with the assumed relationship
between population immunity to transmission and the
probability of an effective introduction (i.e., PEF), which
also remains uncertain. Different assumptions about the
speed of spread between populations will imply different
requirements for the aggressiveness of the outbreak re-
sponse and stockpile size. Given the uncertainty, this ana-
lysis suggests that erring on the side of more aggressive
outbreak response represents the prudent approach as long
as the risk of mOPV exportations remains low (i.e., during
the first few years after OPV cessation). Other key uncer-
tainties that affect the probability of outbreaks and/or their
consequences include (1) the long-term survival of immu-
nodeficient patients in lower income levels, (2) the impact
of IPV-induced immunity on transmission and/or extent of
fecal-oral spread in different populations, (3) the quality
and frequency of tOPV rounds until OPV2 cessation and
bOPV rounds leading up to OPV13 cessation, (4) the future
rate of releases of WPV or Sabin seeds strains from IPV
production sites in the context of different levels of con-
tainment, (5) the unpredictable occurrence of very rare
other events long after OPV cessation with very large con-
sequences, and (6) the potential for OPV used during out-
break response to generate new VDPV outbreaks
elsewhere.
Conclusions
This analysis suggests a relatively high probability of sig-
nificant economic benefits associated with OPV cessation
and global poliovirus risk management efforts for the next
40 years, with a small probability of a failure to contain
outbreaks after OPV cessation. The results highlight the
critical importance of multiple long-term poliovirus risk
management efforts and important uncertainties that re-
main for the post-OPV-cessation era.
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